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INTRODUCTION

V

arious sources throughout the world, primarily the mass media
and nongovernmental organizations, routinely publish reports on
the conduct and circumstances of states. These reports shape states’ reputations in the eyes of individuals, publics, organizations, and governments. While most reporting may be presumed accurate, disinformation
inevitably finds its way into the international public domain.1 Whether
such disinformation is a product of biased agendas, interests of political
actors, omissions of relevant details, or merely a matter of honest mistakes, it might do injustice to the states concerned.
Several examples show that this phenomenon does not discriminate
among states on the basis of political orientation. According to false, or
at least questionable, allegations voiced in the past, Bolivia had an
astonishing rate of infant deaths (2007);2 Iran forced non-Muslims residing in its territory to wear identification patches (2006);3 Iraq killed
Kuwaiti babies in hospital incubators (1990)4 and held weapons of mass
destruction (2003);5 Israel carried out a massacre in Jenin refugee camp
(2002);6 the U.S. military employed nerve gas during the Vietnam War (a
report published in 1998)7 and its interrogators at Guantánamo Bay
flushed a Koran down a toilet (2005);8 and the Uzbek police tortured a
person to death (2004).9 From this list, we may reasonably assume that
1. See Colin B. Picker, Reputational Fallacies in International Law: A Comparative
Review of United States and Canadian Trade Actions, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 67 (2004).
2. Press release, UNICEF Bolivia Office, UNICEF Bolivia Clarifies Information on
Infant Mortality Published by Amnesty International (May 23, 2007).
3. Douglas Kelly, Our Mistake: Note to Readers, NAT’L POST, May 24, 2006, at A2,
available at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=6df3e493-f350-4b53-bc1653262b49a4f7.
4. WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
“A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” 347, 575 (1998).
5. Michael Gordon, Bush Enlarges Case for War by Linking Iraq with Terrorists,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 2003, at A1.
6. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, JENIN: IDF MILITARY OPERATIONS 4 (2002), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/israel3/israel0502.pdf; UN Says No Massacre in Jenin,
BBC NEWS, Aug. 1, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2165272.stm.
7. CNN Retracts Tailwind Coverage, CNN, July 2, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/
US/9807/02/tailwind.johnson/#1.
8. Katharine Q. Seelye & Neil A. Lewis, Newsweek Says It Is Retracting Koran
Report, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/05/17/politics/17koran.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print.
9. Human Rights Watch Statement on the Death of Andrei Shelkavenko, HUM. RTS.
WATCH, May 31, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/05/31/human-rights-watchstatement-death-andrei-shelkavenko.

110

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:1

other beliefs currently shared by the international community might
actually be based on erroneous reports. The fact that in some instances
the falsity of such reports was eventually revealed does not guarantee a
similar result in other instances. It certainly does not ensure that inaccuracies are corrected early enough to prevent severe detriment.
Nevertheless, no effective relief is currently available to defamed
states. Presumably, most states share the notion that reputation is merely
an interest and not a right, hence the weak efforts to subject their reputations to international legal protection. A similar attitude prevails in the
academic literature. As will be demonstrated, scholars have mostly
focused on connections between reputation and both economic and
political power, as well as the manners in which reputational concerns
incentivize compliance with international law and treaty obligations.10
Meanwhile, barely any attention has been dedicated to states’ legal abilities to protect their reputations against wrongful harm. This Article fills
that void by attempting to conceptualize state reputation as a legal right
and to determine what remedies states may use to enforce such a right.
Bearing in mind that general principles of law recognized by national
legal systems form a source of inspiration for international law,11 the observation that almost every state in the world has a civil or criminal law
protecting individual and institutional reputation against defamation12 is
highly significant. Generally speaking, the core issue redressed by
domestic defamation law is false allegations injurious to reputation.13
Although offensive expressions of opinion—which can neither be proved
nor rebutted—are punishable in some jurisdictions under certain cir-

10. See infra Parts III, IV.
11. Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
12. MARK W. JANIS, RICHARD S. KAY & ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 268 (3d ed. 2008); Bonnie Docherty, Defamation
Law: Positive Jurisprudence, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 263, 266 (2000); U.S. Agency for
International Development Office of Democracy and Governance, The Enabling Environment for Free and Independent Media: Contribution to Transparent and Accountable
Governance, OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES, Jan. 2002, at 38, available at
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm00
6.pdf [hereinafter Enabling Environment].
13. C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State
of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 237
(1993); Shawn A. Bone, Private Harms in the Cyber-World: The Conundrum of Choice
of Law for Defamation Posed by Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
279, 325 n.250 (2005); Elena Yanchukova, Criminal Defamation and Insult Laws: An
Infringement on the Freedom of Expression in European and Post-Communist Jurisdictions, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861, 863 (2003).
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cumstances, the central meaning of defamation around the world, under
which most cases fall in practice, seems to concern derogatory statements of fact.14 The internationally agreed-upon notion that a collective
of actors should employ a set of norms protecting the reputations of its
individual members may be applied to states if sufficient similarities between the domestic and the international realms can be traced.
Drawing insights from the disciplines of political science, international
relations, sociology, and communications studies, this Article will argue
that the principal rationales of defamation law, which typically concerns
natural persons and private legal entities, are indeed relevant to states as
well. Given the prominence of mass media reporting and public opinion
in today’s international arena, false defamatory statements harm substantial interests of states, especially politically and economically weaker
states. This is particularly true when states are accused of violating the
laws of war or international human rights, to which immense moral significance is attributed. The harm states suffer also generates side-effects
that are often felt by individual citizens domestically. Furthermore,
viewed from the perspective of the international community, defamatory
falsehoods reduce states’ incentives to comply with international law,
and render global decision-making less informed and, consequently, less

14. Under the dictates of the American Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, a statement of opinion is not actionable unless “it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). In other common law jurisdictions, the defense of “Fair
Comment” (sometimes called “Honest Opinion”) precludes recovery for expressions of
such kind relating to matters of public interest. See William Akel & Tracey J. Walker,
New Zealand, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY 271, 280 (Christian Campbell ed.,
1997); Peter L. Bartlett, Australia, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY 3, 21–22; Roger
D. McConchie, Canada, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY 57, 74–76; Alan Williams,
England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY 107, 114. In addition, the defamation laws of most Continental countries provide for a defense for expressions of opinion, though such defense is usually qualified. See INTERNATIONAL LIBEL AND PRIVACY
HANDBOOK: A GLOBAL REFERENCE FOR JOURNALISTS, PUBLISHERS, WEBMASTERS, AND
LAWYERS 378–79 (Charles J. Glasser, Jr. ed., 2006) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LIBEL
AND PRIVACY HANDBOOK]; EMMANUEL E. PARASCHOS, MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION: NATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES 60 (1998).
The European Court of Human Rights similarly grants what it labels “value-judgments”
heightened protection. See Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407
(1986). The opinion defense is also recognized by the laws of major Asian states, namely,
Hong Kong, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Singapore. INTERNATIONAL LIBEL
AND PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra, at 378–79. For further support for the contention that
defamation law focuses on factual statements, see generally Dienes & Levine, supra note
13, at 237; Bone, supra note 13, at 325 n.250.
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efficient. Arguably, defamatory falsehoods also undermine individuals’
rights to be properly informed and to take a meaningful part in global
governance.
Hence, this Article will call for an acknowledgment of state reputational rights within international law through a novel normative framework parallel to established domestic defamation laws. The right to
reputation would only protect states against inaccurate statements of fact
depicting concrete events, as distinguished from unpleasing professional
or ideological views about complex political situations, or critical statements of opinion. The proposed regime—the precise, detailed characterization of which exceeds the scope of this Article—would aim to
vindicate unjustly defamed reputations without imposing any sanction
whatsoever on publishers. Alternatively, this Article will propose the
establishment of a mechanism for the effective dissemination of states’
replies to defamatory accusations.
Following a review and an analysis of the current domestic and international legal landscape in Part I, this Article will apply the logic of domestic defamation law to the international realm. Part II of this Article
will examine the perspective of the defamed state and its nationals,
describing the political, economic, and personal harms that defamatory
publications targeting states produce. Part III will demonstrate the ways
in which false allegations regarding states can interfere with international
efforts to establish organized, efficient, and rational global governance.
Part IV will explain why defamation against states is an existing phenomenon and why such defamatory communications are internalized by
their recipients (both presuppositions up to this point), thereby spotlighting the practical importance of protecting the reputations of states. Thus,
Part IV will argue that contemporary trends in global politics and media
jeopardize states’ abilities to maintain accurate reputations in that they
foster the wide circulation of false defamatory allegations, render such
statements highly influential, and stymie correction of such statements.
Finally, Part V will briefly touch upon the question—which merits separate research—of how to solve the posed problem. Part V will discuss
several parameters for plausible courses of action, which take into
account the various interests at stake, including those of publishers of
defamatory content as well as the collective interest in preserving freedom of speech.
I. CURRENT PROTECTION OF STATE REPUTATION UNDER DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LAWS
The following review of the contemporary legal situation aims to illustrate two points: (1) that there is a lacuna concerning the protection of
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state reputation; and (2) that this state of affairs is not grounded in any
sweeping jurisprudential rationale or general policy consideration that
deny altogether the theoretical justification for such protection.
A. The Domestic Level
Democracies seem to share the position that expressions portraying a
state, government, or subdivision thereof in a negative light normally do
not give rise to liability.15 This is so in both the civil and the criminal
contexts, which will be discussed separately.
In many democratic legal systems, governmental entities may not file
civil suits for defamation that targets them.16 Such an approach has been
endorsed, for instance, by courts in the United States,17 the United Kingdom,18 Australia,19 India, and South Africa.20 Thus, when a governmental
body is criticized as such in an impersonal manner—without explicit or
implicit reference to any of its individual members—no cause of action
arises.21 While legal authorities following this approach typically handle
cases in which governmental bodies file claims in their own jurisdictions,
there is no reason to assume courts would treat differently suits brought

15. See sources cite infra note 21.
16. See Docherty, supra note 12, at 267.
17. E.g., City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86 (Ill. 1923); State v. Time, Inc.,
249 So. 2d 328, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1971), writ denied, 252 So. 2d 456 (La. 1971); Johnson City v. Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 477 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tenn. 1972); see also 1
ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS §
2.10.1 n.554 (3d ed. 2003); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:76 (2d ed.
2009).
18. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 534
(HL) (U.K.).
19. Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 680 (Austl.).
20. Docherty, supra note 12, at 268–69.
21. IAN LOVELAND, POLITICAL LIBELS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 121–22 (2000); David
A. Elder, Small Town Police Forces, Other Governmental Entities and the Misapplication of the First Amendment to the Small Group Defamation Theory—A Plea for Fundamental Fairness for Mayberry, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 881, 912–13 (2004); Joseph H.
King, Jr., Reference to the Plaintiff Requirement in Defamatory Statements Directed at
Groups, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 343, 352 (2000). Note that the New South Wales
Court—and perhaps also the English House of Lords, according to the New South Wales
court’s interpretation of the Derbyshire decision—left open the possibility of suing for
malicious or injurious falsehood. Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland (1994) 33
N.S.W.L.R. at 691. Yet this cause of action is probably not very useful in the context of
attacks on governmental bodies, because it requires both proof of malice and quantifiable
economic loss. John Fleming, Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies for Defamation, 12 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 15, 18 (1978).

114

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:1

by foreign states. Not only would such an approach constitute discrimination against the domestic government, but entertainment of these
claims is also expected to raise serious problems, as will be explained
below.22
Two main arguments underlie the aforementioned policy, neither of
which compels the conclusion that states’ reputations in the international
community are not to be protected.
The first rationale is the proposition that governmental entities do not
meet the definition of a “person,” to whom the defamation cause of action generally relates.23 Thus, a Louisiana court of appeal held in State v.
Time, Inc. that the state, which is a creature of the people and does not
exist separately from the people, is incapable of being defamed by the
people.24 The Court of Appeal of New South Wales based its view on
quite a similar argument.25 The English House of Lords elaborated this
notion by observing that in the case of an elected body temporarily under
the control of one political party or another, it is difficult to say that such
a body has any reputation of its own. According to this view,
“[R]eputation in the eyes of the public is more likely to attach itself to
the controlling political party,” or to the executives who carry on such
body’s day-to-day management.26
Yet, this line of reasoning appears to be confined to domestic relations
between government and citizenry. The rationale that governmental bodies do not have any independent image in the minds of the people they
represent does not seem to apply in the international realm, where various actors interact in a more-or-less horizontal manner and none is
elected directly by the others. A simple example demonstrates this point.
While it may be true that the German Ministry of Health has no reputation among the German people distinct from that of the Ministry’s senior
22. See infra Part VI. It should be noted that high-ranking officials who have been
individually defamed are not barred a priori from suing for defamation abroad. As the
officials’ actions are often equated with those of their states, such claims could also serve
the reputational interests of the states. For a famous example see Sharon v. Time, Inc.,
599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). However, personal reference may not always be inferred from a defamatory report pertaining to a state. Moreover, the problems inherent in
handling matters of that kind in domestic courts, explained infra in Part II(A), also affect
personal suits.
23. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 4:76.
24. State v. Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d 328, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1971), writ denied, 252 So.
2d 456 (La. 1971).
25. Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 680 (Austl.).
26. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 550
(HL) (U.K.).
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officials or governing political party, the Federal Republic of Germany
certainly has a reputation in the eyes of other states’ leaders, foreign publics, and nongovernmental organizations. Furthermore, as we shall later
see, the contention that states have reputations abroad is firmly supported
by vast international relations literature.27
The second policy consideration that leads courts to deny governments’ standing in civil defamation suits is the importance of allowing
criticism of governments.28 Under U.S. law, this approach is grounded in
the First Amendment of the Constitution, the primary purpose of which
is to ensure the freedom to criticize the government without the threat of
retaliation of any kind.29 Similarly, the House of Lords has held that under English common law principles “[i]t is of the highest public importance that . . . any governmental body . . . should be open to uninhibited
public criticism.”30 Once again, however, what these courts have in mind
is the domestic defamation action familiar to them, in which the publisher
of the allegedly defamatory material finds himself or herself the defendant in a judicial proceeding and faces sanctions if found liable. In contrast, if substantially different paths are adopted for vindicating states’
reputations—paths that do not involve adversary litigation—such difficulty might be resolved. The final Part of this Article will propose such a
solution.
The state of the law is somewhat different in the criminal context. The
legislation of many states renders certain expressions against the government, usually falling under the general category of “sedition,” criminally punishable.31 Sedition laws often cover value judgments and true
statements, in addition to false allegations.32 Such laws are particularly
common in regions that are relatively unstable or where democratic principles are not deeply rooted, such as Asia,33 Africa,34 and Eastern
27. See infra Part III.
28. Docherty, supra note 12, at 267.
29. E.g., City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 90 (Ill. 1927); Johnson City v.
Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 477 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tenn. 1972); see also SMOLLA, supra
note 17, § 4:76.
30. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 547
(HL) (U.K.).
31. See infra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
32. See Enabling Environment, supra note 12, at 34.
33. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT NO 104, FIGHTING WORDS: A
REVIEW OF SEDITION LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 134, (2006), available at http://www.austlii.
edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/104/ALRC104.pdf [hereinafter ALRC REPORT].
34. Id. at 138; H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 1297 (2006).
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Europe,35 and they are most prevalent in authoritarian regimes.36 Western
countries, however, have restricted the applicability of these laws over
the years to communications that endanger national security or the public
order; they are normally only resorted to in rare, extreme circumstances.37 When European states, in particular, attempt to utilize such
statutes, they are often restrained by the European Court of Human
Rights.38
Two issues are particularly important for the purposes of this Article.
First, it may be inferred from the above discussion that mere defamation
of a state, devoid of salient security implications, seldom gives rise to
indictment in democratic states. Second, sedition laws seem to prohibit
only insults directed at domestic authorities. Comprehensive comparative
surveys of the areas of defamation, sedition, and political speech do not
mention any statute criminalizing defamation against foreign states (as
opposed to contempt of their flags or symbols) or indictment brought for
such expressions.39 Thus, the current level of protection for states’ reputations is even further reduced. Assuming40 that states’ interests in reputation reside primarily in the realm of international relations, a ruling of a
35. See Yanchukova, supra note 13, at 870.
36. See id. at 883–90.
37. See ALRC REPORT, supra note 33, at 120, 133–38; PARASCHOS, supra note 14, at
97–101; Yanchukova, supra note 13, at 871, 873. As these sources indicate, the scope of
sedition laws has been restricted through statutory amendments, judicial interpretation, or
prosecutorial policy.
38. E.g., Castells v. Spain, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 445, 464 (1992) (finding that the Spanish
government’s attempted use of a defamation action against a politician representing Basque separatists violated the politician’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 13778/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 843 (1992) (finding similarly that the Icelandic government’s prosecution of a journalist for writing about
alleged police brutality violated the journalist’s Article 10 rights).
39. See ALRC REPORT, supra note 33; DAVID I. FISHER, DEFAMATION VIA SATELLITE:
A EUROPEAN LAW PERSPECTIVE 157–80 (1998); INTERNATIONAL LIBEL AND PRIVACY
HANDBOOK, supra note 14; INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY, supra note 14; LOVELAND,
supra note 21; PARASCHOS, supra note 14; PETER N. AMPONSAH, LIBEL LAW, POLITICAL
CRITICISM, AND DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC FIGURES: THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND
AUSTRALIA (2004); Richard N. Winfield & Kristin Mendoza, The Abolition Movement:
Decriminalizing Defamation and Insult Laws, 25 COMM. LAW. 7 (2007); Docherty, supra
note 12; Yanchukova, supra note 13. It should be noted that under certain circumstances,
some States prohibit insults against foreign state officials, but not against the foreign
states themselves. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code],Nov. 13, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI. I] 3322, as amended Dec. 19, 2001, § 103; PARASCHOS,
supra note 14, at 67–69 (discussing Italian law).
40. See infra Part III.
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domestic court in favor of its own government—which is not expected to
gain much prominence and trust abroad—is arguably quite unhelpful.
Nevertheless, the absence (or scarcity) of legislation prohibiting defamation against foreign states, as well as the limited feasibility of punishing expressions against domestic democratic governments, do not in and
of themselves negate the justification for protecting state reputation under international law. First, one might guess that the main reason states
permit defamation that targets other states is simply the lack of sufficient
practical interest to proscribe such defamation, at least on a unilateral
basis. Second, the freedom of speech concerns that led to the restriction
of sedition laws are arguably far less significant when the speech one
seeks to regulate is false statements of fact, as opposed to true statements
of fact or value judgments. The European Court of Human Rights, for
instance, has refrained from holding that false allegations targeting a
government may not be penalized; on the contrary, it can be inferred
from the Court’s decisions that they may.41
Thus, when examining the practical concerns that drive countries to
leave state reputation essentially unprotected under domestic laws, it is
apparent that these concerns, on the one hand, do not touch upon the
theoretical dimension of the problem, and, on the other hand, are hardly
applicable in the international realm.
B. The International Level
There has been only one genuine attempt during the last several decades to protect states from defamation internationally. This attempt was
made within the Convention on the International Right of Correction
(“CIRC”),42 which entered into force in 1962. The contracting states intended for the CIRC to, inter alia, “implement the right of their peoples
to be fully and reliably informed[,] . . . to improve understanding between their peoples through the free flow of information and opinion,”
and to redress the danger to the “maintenance of friendly relations between peoples . . . arising from the publication of inaccurate reports.”43
Under the CIRC, when a contracting state contends that a news report
published about it abroad is false or distorted, and capable of injuring its

41. See Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 865-66; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 2),
App. No. 24122/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (1999), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_
EN.
42. Convention on the International Right of Correction, 31, 1953, 435 U.N.T.S. 191
[hereinafter CIRC].
43. Id. Preamble.
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relations with other states or its national dignity, the state may submit its
version of the facts to the contracting states where the report has been
disseminated.44 The receiving states are obliged to forward the reply to
the relevant media outlets.45 If any of the receiving states fails to do so,
the defamed state may then submit the reply to the United Nations Secretary-General, who is prompted by the CIRC to give the reply appropriate
publicity through the information channels at his disposal.46
The CIRC’s impact is rendered insignificant by the fact that it was only
joined by a small number of states,47 none of which, except France, may
be regarded as a strong player in the international community. Furthermore, parties to the CIRC have rarely made use of it.48 This probably
stems from the CIRC’s ineffectiveness at protecting state reputations,
since it does not require the media to publish states’ replies.49
The question is why states have refrained from devising greater protection for their reputations than that provided by the CIRC. One possible
answer may be found in the Preamble of the CIRC itself. According to
the Preamble, the imposition of international penalties for the publication
of false reports is not practicable. Since the international libel law regime
proposed by this Article does not mandate the imposition of sanctions,
the Preamble’s practicality concern does not preclude it. Under another
explanation, it is the weak states whose reputations are most jeopardized
and who find it the most difficult to communicate their views to foreign
audiences.50 This very weakness also prevents them from redressing their
problem effectively in the international legal field. Alternatively, perhaps
what is missing is merely a conceptual or a definitional shift, which
would elevate the interest in reputation—undoubtedly recognized by
each and every state—into a right.51
44. Id. art. 2.
45. Id. art. 3.
46. Id. art. 4.
47. For a list of states parties, see United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on
the International Right of Correction, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVII-1&chapter=17&lang=en (last visited Aug. 26, 2009).
48. Kyu Ho Youm, The Right of Reply and Freedom of the Press: An International
and Comparative Perspective, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2008).
49. Charles Danziger, The Right of Reply in the United States and Europe, 19
N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 171, 194–95 (1986).
50. See infra Parts III, V.
51. For the sake of comparison, it may reasonably be assumed that people have always felt outraged when private information about their lives was disclosed without their
permission, but it had never occurred to them that they might be entitled to a remedy for
their harm until the law started to conceptualize the interest in privacy as a legal right.
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II. THE STATE’S PERSPECTIVE: DEFAMATION AND THE NEED TO
REDRESS ITS CONSEQUENCES
The following section will attempt to show, from the perspective of the
defamed state and its nationals, how the basic principles and objectives
underlying domestic defamation laws support the claim that states should
be protected by a similar set of norms.
A. Drawing an Analogy from Domestic Defamation Laws
Domestic defamation laws seek to preserve a given reputation or image
enjoyed by the individual in the eyes of others or society at large.52 Such
laws are based on the premise that false derogatory statements of fact
relating to a person have the capability of altering third parties’ attitudes
toward the person, thereby causing him or her unjust injuries.53 Those
injuries may manifest in various forms, such as a reduction in the
subject’s social status, interferences with his or her relationships and professional progress, pecuniary harm stemming from loss of employment
income or business revenue, and emotional distress.54
Significantly, not only natural persons but also juridical persons are
recognized as capable of suffering damages from defamatory publications and are granted the right to sue for them. Although some jurisdictions limit recovery to certain kinds of entities, or for provable economic
loss only, there is a large international consensus that business corporations may sue for defamation, or at least have a parallel cause of action

For a detailed discussion of the development of the right to privacy in American law, see
Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the
Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002).
52. See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander §2 (1995) (“The law of defamation embodies the public policy that individuals should be free to enjoy their reputations
unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks.”).
53. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); Eric Barendt, What is
the Point of Libel Law?, 52 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 110, 112–15 (1999); Clay
Calvert, Harm to Reputation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Impact of Denial of
Defamatory Allegations, 26 PAC. L.J. 933, 940 (1995); David McCraw, How Do Readers
Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41 CATH. U.L. REV. 81, 84 (1991); Docherty,
supra note 12, at 265; Maryann McMahon, Defamation Claims in Europe: A Survey of
the Legal Armory, 19 COMM. LAW., Winter 2002, at 24, 30 (reviewing the definition of
defamation in various European jurisdictions). Regarding defamation law’s focus on false
statements of fact, see sources cited supra note 13.
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); SMOLLA, supra note 17, §§
1:23, 1:24; David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 747, 765–67 (1984); Barendt, supra note 53, at 116–18.
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for trade libel or commercial disparagement.55 This approach reflects the
common belief that large organizations may have reputations in the
minds of third parties distinct from those of the people comprising
them.56 Organizations build such reputations through hard work, talent,
and, possibly, virtuous conduct.57 Financial revenues serve as the main
indicator of their reputations.58 Defamatory utterances, including those
pertaining to the quality of products or services, are capable of harming
the organization’s reputation, thereby depriving it, at least partially, of
the fruits of its labor.59
The notion that an artificial being with no intrinsic honor or feelings
can bring suit in defamation may be applied to another entity that is
legally and factually separable from the human collective comprising it,
and that undoubtedly has a reputation in the minds of others—the state.
Much like corporations, states have financial interests of their own. If
and when these interests are jeopardized by defamation, granting states
relief may be justified, similarly to the case of corporations. Furthermore,
as opposed to nearly all corporations, whose ultimate objective is profit
maximization, states have many nonfinancial interests in the international sphere. The question is whether, how, and to what extent states’ legitimate interests are affected by defamatory publications targeting them.
If such harms can be demonstrated, then the state—as the principal subject of rights and duties in international law—is arguably entitled to
protection against them.60
It is worth noting that, according to some scholars, the reputations of
states are not uniform but, rather, context-specific. Under this approach,

55. This is the law, for instance, in Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, England,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Singapore,
Spain, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United States. See INTERNATIONAL LIBEL AND
PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra note 14. It should be noted that the European Court of
Human Rights has deemed it legitimate to grant corporations a cause of action for defamation. See Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 403, 435 (2005); Markt
Intern & Beermann v. Germany, App. No. 10572/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 161, 173-75
(1989).
56. See SACK, supra note 17, § 2.10.1, and sources cited therein.
57. Barendt, supra note 53, at 115.
58. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693–96 (1986).
59. See Post, supra note 58, at 693–96; see also Barendt, supra note 53, at 115.
60. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965
(1941), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf (finding
the United States entitled to indemnification for injury, proven by clear evidence, resulting from Canada’s operation of the Trail Smelter).
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each state has a relatively independent reputation in the areas of trade,
environment, human rights, and so forth, in addition to reputations in
matters that are unrelated to legal compliance, such as financial and political stability, and military strength.61 For the purpose of the following
discussion, however, it is not necessary to decide whether such a view
has merit,62 nor is it crucial to make a priori distinctions between different kinds of state reputations. In order to satisfy the main goal of this
Article and establish states’ conceptual entitlement to a right of reputation, it is sufficient to prove in general that defamation targeting states
exposes them to tangible harms. As the examples presented below will
demonstrate, such harms do occur at least with regard to the specific
areas mentioned by a given defamatory publication, and, in some cases,
other areas as well. For the sake of comparison, the legal concept of
reputation in private law comprises an individual’s interest in being respected by society in regard to various aspects of his or her personality—
morality, honesty, compliance with law (in any legal field), professional
competence, and so forth—unitarily.63 Moreover, as we have seen, very
different types of harm related to such different interests jointly justify
protecting individuals against defamation in positive law. A similar
approach may therefore be taken in the context of state reputation.
B. The Value of State Reputation
Perceptions of a state’s characteristics, behavior, or condition obviously impact the choices of foreign state officials and non-state actors in
their dealings with that state.64 Thus, for example, by developing and
preserving a good reputation for compliance with obligations, states are
able to extract greater concessions in exchange for their promises.65 Furthermore, the level of foreign investment in any given state is immensely

61. George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S101–03 (2002).
62. Contra Picker, supra note 1, at 107.
63. See, e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt, Section 43(a), Commercial Falsehood, and the
First Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REV. 309, 338–39 (1993); Post,
supra note 59, at 693–719.
64. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 107
(2004); Juyan Zhang & William L. Benoit, Message Strategies of Saudi Arabia’s Image
Restoration Campaign after 9/11, 30 PUB. REL. REV. 161, 161 (2004).
65. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1823, 1886 (2002).
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affected by evaluations of the state’s financial situation.66 Communications scholar Jian Wang summarizes this notion by observing that
a nation’s reputational capital may affect the country’s ability to build
coalitions and alliances to achieve international political objectives, to
influence perceptions and purchase decisions regarding products from
certain countries of origin, to attract foreign investment or in-bound
tourism.67

In addition, government officials’ beliefs concerning another state’s
conduct could lead the first state to respond in a way that harms the latter’s interests. For instance, information indicating that a state has
breached its bilateral or multilateral obligations, such as by engaging in
acts of aggression, might induce other states to resort to trade or diplomatic sanctions, or to take military actions against it.68
The issue of state reputation is particularly acute in the modern day.
Since the global phenomenon of democratization has increased governments’ attention to their citizens’ views regarding foreign policies,69
mass media and public opinion have come to play major roles in international politics.70 In a two-step process, mass media communications on
international matters shape public opinion of states and events,71 which
in turn, affects directly or indirectly the foreign policies of states and the
actions of the international community vis-à-vis the states concerned.72
Naturally, this effect is mostly prominent in democracies. But even nondemocratic regimes are influenced to a certain extent by domestic public
66. Evidence of which is supplied, for instance, by credit rating agencies.
67. Jian Wang, Managing National Reputation and International Relations in the
Global Era: Public Diplomacy Revisited, 32 PUB. REL. REV. 91, 92 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
68. See Guzman, supra note 65, at 1846.
69. See MICHAEL KUNCZIK, IMAGES OF NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
RELATIONS 20 (1997); Eytan Gilboa, Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, 616
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 55, 56 (2008); Evan Potter, Canada and the New
Public Diplomacy, 58 INT’L J. 43, 48–49 (2002–2003).
70. PHILIP M. TAYLOR, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE
MEDIA SINCE 1945 58 (1997); Gilboa, supra note 69, at 58.
71. For further analysis, see infra Part IV.
72. Einar Östgaard, Factors Influencing the Flow of News, 2 J. PEACE RES. 39, 54
(1965). Many studies indicate, for instance, that public opinion has been a preeminent
factor in the formation of the foreign policies of recent American administrations. See
John R. Worth, Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty: Reconsidering the “Un-signing” of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker, 79
IND. L.J. 245, 263–64 (2004); Stuart N. Soroka, Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign
Policy, HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL., Jan. 2003, at 27 and sources cited therein.
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opinion,73 though such public opinion is much more susceptible to manipulation by the governments themselves than in democracies.
Public opinion of foreign states—and the events and situations involving them—may affect foreign policy in diverse ways. First, and most
directly, foreign policy platforms introduced by candidates and parties in
national elections can play a factor in voters’ decisions, which are
thereafter expressed in the actual policies implemented by the elected
government. Second, the public can exert pressure on the government to
act in a particular fashion with regard to a discrete situation.74 Real-time
media reporting of dramatic news events, especially through televised
images, tends to arouse an emotional response on the part of the public,
who then demands that quick and often simplistic measures be taken to
deal with the crisis.75 Commentators use the phrase “CNN effect” to describe “television coverage, primarily of horrific humanitarian disasters,
that forces policy makers to take actions they otherwise would not have
taken, such as military intervention.”76 Third, a subtler but arguably more
consistent and profound impact of public opinion on foreign policy is
embedded in the general images and reputations it attributes to states.
The level of popularity enjoyed by a state in public opinion abroad influences its ability to achieve concessions from foreign governments and to
reach other desired policy outcomes.77 International law, among other
factors, plays an important role in this context. Alleged violations of its
norms—particularly those pertaining to human rights—tend to have a
strong impact on public opinion, which in turn shapes foreign policies
and private actors’ economic choices.78
Thus, according to Wang:
National reputation is unquestionably an instrument of power . . . .
[F]oreign public opinion is gaining ever more significance in forming
an emerging globalized public and influencing international political
73. E.g., Moshe Hirsch, The Future Negotiations over Jerusalem, Strategical Factors
and Game Theory, 45 CATH. U.L. REV. 699, 716 n.57 (1996); Richard A. Posner, The
Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 7 (1993).
74. TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 58–59; Kristine A. Oswald, Mass Media and the
Transformation of American Politics, MARQ. L. REV. 385, 403–04 (1994); Potter, supra
note 69, at 48–49.
75. TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 94–95.
76. Gilboa, supra note 69, at 63.
77. See NYE, supra note 64, at 36–37, 129–30.
78. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq and the Future of United States Foreign Policy: Failures of Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 149, 159–60 (2004); see also Robert
Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 333 (2004).
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process and outcome . . . . [T]he role of individuals and their expressed
opinions do form a climate of opinion, in which decision-makers pursue policies. When public opinion is activated, the climate of opinion
can limit or broaden policy choices and actions. Therefore, the perceptions and opinions held by foreign publics regarding a given nation
become critically important to decisions by nation-states.79

And, as Professor Evan Potter further explains:
Image counts for a lot in contemporary world politics. Whether a country needs to build international coalitions against terrorism, co-operate
to protect the environment, attract foreign investment, or bring in foreign students, influencing foreign public opinion is critical to national
success because, in the absence of substantial military or economic
weight, most countries are the image or ‘words’ they project abroad.
Their room to maneuver is affected by their image, or soft power, so
that all points of contact—whether promoting policies or exporting—
will feed off this general image in both positive and negative ways.80

Notably, a state’s reputation often has concrete implications for its
population. For instance, national economic recession—which, in the
context of this Article, could result from the shattering of a state’s international status, a reduction of its credit rating, or sanctions or boycotts
imposed on it in response to its perceived behavior—tends to percolate
down to the level of the ordinary citizen. In addition, the scope of tourism and foreign investment directly affects domestic businesses.81 Finally, since the state represents the collective interests of its citizens in the
international arena,82 its negotiating power and ability to extract concessions could dictate prevailing conditions in a myriad of areas that are
relevant to the citizens’ lives and welfare, such as security, international
trade, health, and the environment.
The high value of reputation is best evidenced by the growing understanding among states of the utility of actively enhancing and using rep-

79. Wang, supra note 67, at 91–92.
80. Potter, supra note 69, at 44.
81. See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2009, Field Listing—Economy (2009), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2116.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (describing tourism as a dominant
or significant industry in a majority of countries, and foreign investment as a significant
factor in the development of many countries’ economies).
82. Daniele Archibugi, From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy, in
COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER 121, 128–29
(Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995).
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utation as a tool of foreign policy.83 Since “communication, education,
and persuasion have become major techniques in foreign relations,”84
successful “image politics” translates to power in the international arena.85 In addition, extensive academic literature is dedicated to the issue of
states’ image strategies, mainly within the context of two related and frequently discussed concepts. The first is soft power: a state’s ability to
achieve its objectives by highlighting the attractiveness of its culture,
political ideals, and policies.86 The second is public diplomacy: the
endeavor to shape foreign public opinion, thereby inducing foreign governments to make policy decisions compatibly with the political objectives of the state taking these measures.87 Scholars have gone so far as to
say that “today half of ‘power politics’ consists of image-making. With
the rising importance of publics in foreign affairs, image-making has
steadily increased.”88 Likewise, it has been contended that
[f]avorable image and reputation around the world, achieved through
attraction and persuasion, have become more important than territory,
access, and raw materials, traditionally acquired through military and
economic measures.89

C. The Harms of Defamation
Having examined the importance of state reputation, we must recall
that information about states inevitably contains inaccuracies in some
cases, and distorts others’ perceptions of those states.90 Such erroneous
perceptions are occasionally favorable to the state concerned, but on other occasions they might portray the state in a negative light. Although a
state’s overall image is the product of a complex plethora of components,
it must be presumed—as domestic defamation laws do—that the available factual information pertaining to an actor is a crucial factor in the
formation of others’ opinions of the actor. It is therefore clear that all the
reputation-related benefits states enjoy in the international arena are jeopardized when false derogatory statements of fact are published about
83. C. Anthony Giffard & Nancy K. Rivenburgh, News Agencies, National Images,
and Global Media Events, 77 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 8, 8 (2000).
84. Gilboa, supra note 69, at 60.
85. Giffard & Rivenburgh, supra note 83, at 8.
86. NYE, supra note 64, at x.
87. See id. at 105; TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 96; Gilboa, supra note 69, at 57, 59;
Wang, supra note 67.
88. John H. Herz, Political Realism Revisited, 25 INT’L STUD. Q. 182, 187 (1981).
89. Gilboa, supra note 69, at 56.
90. For elaboration see Part IV infra.
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them. The damage may be irreversible, even if the truth is finally
revealed after months or years, as history is “a succession of short-run
situations that may alter the course of events for good.”91 While a state’s
significant political, economic, or military power may counterbalance
certain reputational harms, the weaker the state, the more acute the consequences of defamation. International legal protection against the harms
of defamation is thus critical.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S PERSPECTIVE: THE
COLLECTIVE INTEREST IN PROTECTING STATES FROM FALSE
DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS
The justifications for establishing an international parallel to domestic
defamation laws transcend particular states’ interests in maintaining their
reputations. The following section will contend—by analogy to the view
that private defamation law serves the society at large—that protecting
state reputation can enhance organized and efficient global governance
for the benefit of the entire international community.
A. Preserving Incentives for Compliance with International Law
Private reputation, so it is contended, is an efficient social mechanism
that promotes cooperation within a community while relying on the selfinterest of the individual.92 Given the social benefits that are bestowed
upon those who are known to conform to public values, and are otherwise denied, reputation provides an incentive to conform to these
values.93 While the dissemination of true information creates transparency and serves the stated objective, false information undermines it. When
it is hard to discern whether negative reports regarding individuals are
true or false, the level of censure an alleged wrongdoer is subjected to
decreases, and the cost associated with wrongdoing consequently lessens.
91. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 264 (Harper &
Row 1975) (1942); Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 124 (1992); Elad Peled,
Constitutionalizing Mandatory Retraction in Defamation Law, 30 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 33, 56 (2007); Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J.
1105, 1130 (1979);
92. See, e.g., Michael Passaportis, A Law and Norms Critique of the Constitutional
Law of Defamation, 90 VA. L. REV. 1985, 1986–87 (2004).
93. TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 20–21 (1969); JOHN J. MACIONIS,
SOCIOLOGY 213 (6th ed. 1997); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 433 (1997); Passaportis, supra note 92, at
1986–87.
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On the other hand, the perceived social advantages of compliance are
moderate or uncertain where compliance does not immunize one from
being accused of noncompliance. Assuming that abiding by any norm
involves certain personal costs, the incentives to respect the community’s
norms thus recede.94 The law of defamation is designed to prevent such
outcomes.
A similar analysis can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the international arena. Arguably, repetitive publication of false reports accusing States
of violating international norms might diminish the overall tendency of
compliance. This proposition is sustainable under the two principal social
science paradigms commonly used to interpret state behavior: rational
choice theory and social constructivism.
According to the rational choice model, States act as “rational decision-makers [by selecting] the course of action . . . that maximizes their
utility, as determined by their goals and the alternative options available
to them.”95 Among the complex plethora of factors affecting the choice
between compliance and defection with regard to a certain norm or regime, a prominent role is attributed to states’ interests in maintaining
good reputations within the international community.96 As international
relations theorists and international lawyers have long argued, States
honor their commitments primarily because they fear that any evidence
of unreliability will reduce the willingness of other actors to interact with
them.97 Having a good reputation for compliance allows States to enter
into more profitable cooperative arrangements,98 and, as explained
above, assists them in achieving various policy goals in the international
political and financial arenas. Thus, whether a state will comply with
international law in any given case depends on the balance of the reputational benefits of compliance and the costs of compliance.
False defamatory publications accusing compliant States of noncompliance undercut the benefits they seek to enjoy by complying. Since this

94. See HIRSCHI, supra note 93, at 16–21; MACIONIS, supra note 93, at 213; Passaportis,
supra note 92, at 1997–99.
95. See, e.g., Moshe Hirsch, Compliance with International Norms in the Age of Globalization: Two Theoretical Perspectives, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 166, 172 (Eyal Benvenisti &
Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004).
96. See Guzman, supra note 65, at 1861, 1870.
97. Downs & Jones, supra note 61, at S95–S96.
98. Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 403 (1989); Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 385 (2006).
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phenomenon renders the perceived political advantages of compliance ex
ante moderated or uncertain, States—especially those that feel routinely
injured—have reduced incentives to maintain international agreements
and abide by international law.99 While the extent of the decrease is obviously speculative and unquantifiable (and constitutes only one of many
factors influencing State behavior), it might become acute in borderline
cases in which the costs and benefits of compliance appear to be equal. It
is asserted, for instance, that when matters of national security are at
stake, the scales are not easily tipped in favor of compliance with the
pertinent international norms,100 such as those demanding respect of human rights during the fight against terrorism. Even when states choose to
comply despite opposing interests, there is necessarily a delicate balance
of cost and benefit. Any minor interference with the equation, in the form
of a decrease in the reputation-related advantages, might therefore
increase the overall rate of noncompliance in these crucial matters.
Social constructivism may lead to similar conclusions. According to
this model, compliance with international law is not the outcome of costbenefit calculations, but rather of a process of international socialization,
driven in a large extent by states’ non-instrumental desires to obtain positive evaluations by their peer members in the international community.101
Much like individuals’ tendencies, most states’ reluctance to provoke
negative social judgments inhibits their inclination to violate norms.102
The preservation of an appropriate incentive to comply thus requires high
compatibility between the reputation a state deserves and its actual reputation.
Sociology may provide us with additional, related insights in this context. For instance, it is contended that a feeling of detachment from
society causes an individual to self-alienate from society and its norms,
which in turn reduces his or her willingness to comply with those

99. Picker, supra note 1, at 114.
100. Guzman, supra note 65, at 1874.
101. See ROBERT H. JACKSON & GEORG SORENSEN, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: THEORIES AND APPROACHES 162 (2007).
102. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 903–04 (1998); Hirsch, supra note 95, at 181;
Vaughn P. Shannon, Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of
Norm Violation, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 293, 297–99 (2000). See generally Jutta Brunnée &
Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional
Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19 (2000); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998).
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norms.103 Moreover, the lower the social status that the individual risks
losing as a consequence of deviance, the higher the likelihood of rulebreaking.104 The same could be applied, perhaps, to states that are
positioned at the periphery of the international community.105 Arguably,
ostracism and isolation of states caused by persistent dissemination of
negative information about them might undermine their tendency to
comply with international law. It is, of course, particularly important to
prevent false information from generating such an outcome.
B. Promoting Informed Global Governance
An important function that defamation law may serve in democratic
societies is fostering informed self-governance, especially where false
publications regarding public figures and public matters are concerned.106
This notion may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the international arena.
It is commonly held, particularly within American First Amendment
jurisprudence, that collective decision-making is best served by the constant exchange of views and information, which enables society to make
informed choices between competing courses of action.107 The information whose free flow is most crucial is the information concerning the
actions of the government and its people.108 However, information must
not only be available but also be accurate in order to sustain valuable and
beneficial public debate. The political value judgments of individuals and
society, which are the driving forces of self-governance, are based largely on raw data.109 Since a decision-maker’s “image of reality” and the
information he or she possesses have significant influence on the deci-

103. HIRSCHI, supra note 93, at 16–21; MACIONIS, supra note 93, at 213; Hirsch, supra
note 95, at 182–83.
104. HIRSCHI, supra note 93, at 16–21; MACIONIS, supra note 93, at 213; Hirsch, supra
note 95, at 182–83.
105. Hirsch, supra note 95, at 182–83.
106. See George E. Frasier, An Alternative to the General-Damage Award for Defamation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 504, 504 (1968).
107. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 18–19
(1993); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 882 (1963); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 260 (1961).
108. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
109. See William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, The First Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 197 (1994).
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sion he or she will make,110 the nature of the information in the public
domain necessarily projects upon the quality of collective decisionmaking. Thus, “democratic governance requires accurate information
and knowledge of public affairs, not mere opinion, and certainly not an
aggregation of uninformed preferences.”111
Clearly, if the public and its representatives deliberate while relying on
false information, the decisions reached are likely to be less wise.112 Dissemination of false defamatory statements pertaining to public officials
and public figures is capable of producing precisely that situation. Even
the U.S. Supreme Court, despite its restrictive approach to defamation
law, has conceded in this context that “there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact.”113 Most resolved in this view was Justice Byron
White, who declared that “First Amendment values are not at all served
by circulating false statements of fact about public officials. On the contrary, erroneous information frustrates these values.”114
Similar to national political processes, international actions are based
not so much on objective international reality as on subjective perceptions of such reality.115 When any of the players in the international
community have in mind an image of a certain event or situation that
does not coincide with reality, their response could be ill-suited to
achieve the intended policy outcomes and may lead to undesirable consequences.116
This contention is applicable, first, to the traditional—and still relevant—realm of foreign policy decisions by state officials. Erroneous
perceptions of a state’s behavior could lead other states to respond in

110. OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., BEYOND AGENDA SETTING: INFORMATION SUBSIDIES AND
PUBLIC POLICY 198 (1982); Johan Galtung & Mari Holmobe Ruge, The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian
Newspapers, 2 J. PEACE RES. 64, 64 (1965); Oswald, supra note 74, at 396.
111. R. Randall Rainey & William Rehg, The Marketplace of Ideas, the Public Interest, and Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media: Implications of Habermas’ Theory
of Democracy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1938 (1996).
112. See Frasier, supra note 106, at 507; Rodney K. Smith & Patrick A. Shea, Religion
and the Press: Keeping First Amendment Values in Balance, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 177,
194–95 (2002).
113. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
114. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
115. KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 20; YAACOV Y. I. VERTZBERGER, THE WORLD IN THEIR
MINDS: INFORMATION PROCESSING, COGNITION, AND PERCEPTION IN FOREIGN POLICY
DECISIONMAKING 7–10, 35–36 (1990); Galtung & Ruge, supra note 110, at 64.
116. Vertzberger, supra note 115 at 22, 35–36.
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manners that injure the interests of the international community as a
whole. Generally speaking, undermining friendly international relations
is harmful in itself, particularly with respect to international stability.117
More concrete examples are the imposition of sanctions on states, which
hampers economically desirable free trade; the exclusion of states from
institutional regimes, which weakens those regimes; and the refusal to
cooperate with states, which results in a loss of the resources and endeavors they could contribute.
The idea that inaccurate perceptions regarding states may lead others to
take harmful action is also true in the era of globalization, in which states
no longer enjoy exclusive power in the international arena.118 Unlike
before, the direction of global politics is determined by complex interactions between a plethora of state and nonstate actors. But what has not
changed is the fact that any of the actors involved can make policy mistakes when provided with inaccurate information, which can thereby
negatively affect collective community interests. Special attention should
be dedicated in this respect to the quality of the information available to
the international public, whose effective participation in global decisionmaking processes is attributed great normative importance.119 For such
participation to be beneficial—i.e., in order for it to ensure a meaningful
manifestation of individual political rights, as well as to promote the

117. See CIRC, supra note 42, Preamble; John B. Whitton, The Problem of Curbing
International Propaganda, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 601, 602 (1966).
118. Linda Weiss, Globalization and National Governance: Antinomy or Interdependence? The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 25 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES (SPECIAL ISSUE) 59, 59–60 (1999).
119. Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human Rights
and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1335, 1361
(1999); Henry Teune, Global Democracy, 581 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22,
23 (2002). Various proposals have been raised for enriching and deepening global democracy and legitimacy by increasing transparency, accountability, and participation.
See, e.g., Archibugi, supra note 82, at 137–41; Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age
of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 202–07 (1999); Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 763, 771–72 (2005); Richard Falk
& Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the
Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 191 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Building Global Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 223 (2000); Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51, 74 (2006); Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 531–
34 (2001).
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collective interest in wise and just decisions—it must be based on appropriate information.120
IV. FACTORS IMPEDING THE MAINTENANCE OF ACCURATE STATE
REPUTATIONS
The preceding analysis of the individual and collective interests in protecting state reputation is of little practical significance if one contends
that states do not face substantial risks of being defamed or that they are
capable of coping with them effectively. The following will attempt to
demonstrate that both contentions are wrong.
A. Threats to States’ Reputations
1. The Public’s Dependence on Information Supply
Before identifying the information sources that actively threaten states’
reputations, one should consider the background against which these
sources operate. Thus, in order to facilitate comprehensive understanding
of the phenomenon of state defamation, this section discusses the characteristics of the primary addressee of defamatory communications: the
international public.121 These characteristics both foster the circulation of
defamation in the first place and render such defamation influential.
Most individuals do not tend to dedicate significant resources to forming their opinions on political matters.122 There is a clear disincentive to
invest individual effort in gathering and evaluating information on public
affairs.123 The costs in terms of time and money are far greater than the
gains since each person’s relative influence on the political process is
negligible, and the impact of the collective decisions on his or her life

120. See CIRC, supra note 42, Preamble (stating that peoples have a right to be fully
and reliably informed); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at
74-75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 19, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 9520, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Alasdair Roberts, Structural Pluralism and the Right to Information, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 243, 260–62 (2001).
121. KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 19; see also sources cited supra notes 69–73.
122. See John G. Matsusaka, Explaining Voter Turnout Patterns: An Information
Theory, 84 PUB. CHOICE 91, 93 (1995) (listing groups for which the expenditures of resources in obtaining information on political matters yield higher returns, including public employees, farm owners, and people who are married, highly educated, older than
average, and long-time residents of a given community).
123. Id.
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often seems remote and obscure.124 The further decisions shift away from
private concerns to issues that lack a direct and unmistakable personal
link, the less motivated are individuals to command the facts and to
shape wise preferences.125 This is even truer with regard to the foreign
and international domains, in which the costs of information gathering
and assessment are greater126 and the effects of political decisions on
one’s personal life are usually slighter. Indeed, many studies have shown
that levels of knowledge about foreign affairs among publics in the developed world are very low.127 This situation provides a fertile ground for
endeavors to fashion the will of the people through the supply of biased
information, and even when inaccuracies are not deliberate, they can easily mislead the public into making unsubstantiated judgments.128
2. Superficial and Biased Media
Since the average person presumably possesses limited personal knowledge of public matters, the media significantly impacts the political
positions he or she is likely to adopt.129 For nearly all concerns on the
public agenda, citizens are exposed to a secondhand reality that is structured by media reports of events and situations, especially with regard to
news concerning foreign affairs. “The media are the principal means by
which the vast majority of individuals receive information about [these
topics,] . . . for which personal experience is unlikely to provide much
useful information.”130 This situation is intensified by the revolution in

124. See Gregory G. Brunk, The Impact of Rational Participation Models on Voting
Attitudes, 35 PUB. CHOICE 549 (1980). Brunk states that “few citizens should vote in any
large-scale election since the chance is very small that any person’s vote will affect an
electoral outcome,” and attributes the apparently contradictorily high levels of voter turnout in most elections to a common idea that voting is a civic duty and makes one a
“good citizen.” Id.
125. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 207–59 (1957);
SCHUMPETER, supra note 91, at 258–61; see also SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING
VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 219 (1991).
126. Benvenisti, supra note 119, at 174.
127. See, e.g., OLE R. HOLSTI, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
289, 215 (rev. ed., 2004) (discussing the US public’s lack of knowledge about foreign
affairs).
128. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 91, at 263; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where’s the
Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation of Lies, 65 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1091, 1097
(2008).
129. POPKIN, supra note 125, at 9.
130. MAXWELL MCCOMBS, SETTING THE AGENDA: THE MASS MEDIA AND PUBLIC
OPINION 1, 12 (2004); Soroka, supra note 72, at 28.
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communication technologies, manifested mainly in the advent of the internet and global news networks such as CNN International, BBC World,
Sky News, and Al-Jazeera, which have enabled “broadcasting . . . almost
every significant development in world events to almost every place on
the globe.”131
In line with the premise of domestic defamation laws—that messages
influence people’s views—various studies have demonstrated that news
reports, especially on television, powerfully shape public opinion,132 particularly with respect to foreign affairs.133 Thus, clear correlations have
been found between media coverage and popular perceptions of foreign
nations.134 One study revealed, for example, that in nine different Muslim
countries, television news viewing has influenced anti-American attitudes more than any other examined variable.135 Hence, mass media is
said to be the strongest shaper of national images.136 These images, in
turn, often translate to public pressure on the political branches to adopt
certain policies vis-à-vis the states concerned.137 It should be noted that
the “mediation” of public opinion between media reports and foreign
policies is not always present or necessary; obviously, political decisionmakers rely on mass media information, which shapes their own beliefs
and orientations with regard to states and situations.138
In light of the media’s overwhelming impact, it is important to
examine the overall quality of the information it conveys.
Despite the noble role attributed to the press in democratic societies—
enabling the citizenry to make informed political, economic, and social
decisions, and serving as a check on the government—the ultimate ob-

131. Gilboa, supra note 69, at 56; see also TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 95.
132. SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS 112 (1987);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 107, at 62. Communications theorists often talk about the “framing”
function of the media, namely, the “selection, exclusion of, and emphasis on certain
issues and approaches to promote a particular definition, interpretation, moral evaluation,
or a solution.” Gilboa, supra note 69, at 63–64.
133. Gilboa, supra note 69, at 64.
134. Id.; Wayne Wanta, Guy Golan & Cheolhan Lee, Agenda Setting and International
News: Media Influence on Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations, 81 JOURNALISM &
MASS COMM. Q. 364, 364 (2004).
135. Erik C. Nisbet et al., Public Diplomacy, Television News, and Muslim Opinion,
HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL., Apr. 2004 at 11, 31.
136. KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 1, 20.
137. Id. at 20; see also Donald L. Jordan & Benjamin I. Page, Shaping Foreign Policy
Opinions: The Role of TV News, 36 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 227, 234 (1992).
138. KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 58, 86; Östgaard, supra note 72, at 54.
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jective of modern media outlets is financial profit.139 Thus, the press
strives to maximize its circulation or rating by adapting the news flow to
assumed audience preferences. This commercial orientation distorts the
media’s priorities by emphasizing their entertainment function at the
expense of their commitment to properly informing the public.140
As a result, news coverage is often characterized by two salient features. First, given the inherent pressure for speed in reporting, and the
lack of patience of most readers and viewers when it comes to long or
complicated argumentation, the media tend to oversimplify the news.141
Second, the nature of the mass media is to prefer sensationalized stories
and negative events, since, compared to the “ordinary,” the “exceptional”
is more newsworthy, and, presumably, more interesting to the public.142
“Good news,” i.e., news relating to good performances or to the nonoccurrence of catastrophes, is seldom considered news at all.143
Similar trends prevail, perhaps to an even greater extent, in foreign affairs reporting.144 As the space or time given to foreign news is restricted
by financial considerations,145 the press often refrains from covering and
explaining “sociostructural contexts or complex motives for actions.”146
In addition, newsworthiness considerations, favoring unusual and dramatic events over complex and prolonged situations and processes, often
deprive the public consciousness of broad context and prevent genuine

139. See AL GORE, THE ASSAULT ON REASON 15–22 (2007). This is so because most of
these firms are privately owned in the developed world.
140. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 32 (1991); Lili Levi, Reporting
the Official Truth:The Revival of the FCC’s News Distortion Policy, 78 WASH. U. L.Q.
1005, 1103 (2000); Östgaard, supra note 72, at 45; Oswald, supra note 74, at 387; Rainey
& Rehg, supra note 111, at 1942; Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J.
1519, 1551–52 (1987).
141. Östgaard, supra note 72, at 45; Oswald, supra note 74, at 394; see also
SCHUMPETER, supra note 91, at 262.
142. Jonathan Graubart, What’s News: A Progressive Framework for Evaluating the
International Debate Over the News, 77 CAL. L. REV. 629, 648 (1989); Levi, supra note
140, at 1129.
143. Oswald, supra note 74, at 404.
144. Global News: TV Coverage of Global Issues, MEDIA MONITOR (Ctr. for Media
and Pub. Aff.: George Mason U., D.C.), Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 1; see also Pew Research
Center, International Stories Don’t Register: Public Takes Note of Swine Flu Vaccine,
PEW RES. CTR. PUB., Aug. 26, 2009, http://www.pewresearch.org/pubs/1323/followinghealth-care-hearing-about-swine-flu.
145. Östgaard, supra note 72, at 44–45.
146. KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 21.

136

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:1

understanding of events.147 Consequently, simplistic reports of alleged
state aggression, human rights violations, and other breaches of international law are inherently prone to gain prominence.
Further harm to state reputation results from media bias. Such bias
might stem from willful editorial decisions, or at least from concrete political views that shape the judgments of journalists and influence the
manner in which they present supposedly hard-fact news.148 In addition,
the foreign news desks of major media outlets often hire local reporters
and photographers residing in conflict zones, who might provide their
employers with information that fits the views and interests of their respective nations.149 It is also well known that totalitarian regimes seek to
control the content of information reported from within their territories
by censoring stories, threatening journalists and limiting their access to
places and sources.150 Publication of deficient or inaccurate reports in
these cases might improperly influence the public’s evaluation of the
behavior of states that are in conflict with such regimes.
Perhaps more latent is the systematic prejudice that developing countries ascribe to the Western press, which dominates the international
news channels.151 Developing countries complain that the coverage of
their affairs is generally negative, incomplete, distorted, and ethnocentric.152 According to this perspective, since all news is filtered through
147. KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 20–22; TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 69; Galtung &
Ruge, supra note 110, at 67; Östgaard, supra note 72, at 45, 48–51.
148. Östgaard, supra note 72, at 44.
149. In September 2000, a Palestinian photographer working for a French television
station documented the killing of a Palestinian boy by the Israeli army. The pictures he
provided were published by the media across the world. A French publicist claimed that
the televised report did not depict the occurrences accurately and that the Palestinian boy
might not have been killed by the Israeli army. Within a libel suit filed against that publicist, a French court of appeals held his allegations to be sustainable by the facts, upon
examining the unedited footage and hearing further evidence. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 17e ch., May 21, 2008, Dossier No. 06/08678, available at
http://www.theaugeanstables.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/arret-appel-21-05-08trebucq.PDF. For a translation of the judgment into English, see http://www.
theaugeanstables.com/2008/06/18/the-court-of-appeals-decision-a-professional-translationinto-english (last visited Aug. 28, 2009). I am thankful to Ben-Dror Yemini for referring me
to these sources.
150. See various examples at Reporters Without Borders, http://www.rsf.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
151. Global News: TV Coverage of Global Issues, supra note 144; see also Noshina
Saleem, U.S. Media Framing of Foreign Countries’ Image: An Analytical Perspective, 2
CAN. J. MEDIA STUD., 130, 137–39 (2007).
152. Saleem, supra note 151, at 144.
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Western moral, cultural, and political values, journalists focus on sensational events that tend to be negative while ignoring processes such as
economic and health development. Additionally, they emphasize the
Western angle of stories at the expense of the broader picture, and mischaracterize events by discussing them out of context.153
Finally, the media obviously make honest mistakes occasionally. Even
in New York Times v. Sullivan, which restricted the law of defamation
probably more than any other judicial decision or piece of legislation in
the world, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that media errors are inevitable.154 To make matters worse, many commentators believe that the
media tends to be very reluctant to publicly admit its errors.155
3. Unregulated and Unaccountable Nongovernmental Organizations
Nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) enjoy considerable power
in global politics with respect to virtually all issues of international concern.156 NGOs pursue their goals mainly through massive involvement in
the activities of supranational bodies157 and—even more relevant to this
Article—through direct communication with publics. By disseminating
information, mostly through the media, NGOs are able to mobilize domestic public opinion in various states to exert pressure on governments
to implement desired policies.158 As discussed in Part IV.A.1, supra, the

153. Graubart, supra note 142, at 635–37; see also KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 22.
154. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964).
155. DONALD M. GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY, AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW 87
(1992); Shannon M. Heim, The Role of Extra-Judicial Bodies in Vindicating Reputational
Harm, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 401, 420 (2007); Ellen M. Smith, Reporting the Truth
and Setting the Record Straight: An Analysis of U.S. and Japanese Libel Laws, 14 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 871, 893 (1993); cf. Aaron Perzanowski, Relative Access to Corrective
Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 836 (2006)
(stating that a victim of false accusations “at best . . . can ask for a correction or hope
another news source will correct the [first’s] mistake.”).
156. Falk & Strauss, supra note 119, at 196–204; Martin Köhler, From the National to
the Cosmopolitan Public Sphere, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN
COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 231, 231 (Daniele Archibugi, David Held & Martin Köhler
eds., 1998); Perritt, supra note 78, at 160.
157. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 119, at 764–65.
158. RODGER A. PAYNE & NAYEF H. SAMHAT, DEMOCRATIZING GLOBAL POLITICS:
DISCOURSE NORMS, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY 48 (2004);
Blitt, supra note 78, at 290, 368; Gilboa, supra note 69, at 59; Zoe Pearson, NonGovernmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 243, 246 (2006); Perritt, supra note
78, at 160–61.
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fact that citizenries are inadequately informed about international affairs
makes them highly vulnerable to NGO influences.159
Human rights NGOs are particularly powerful.160 The international
community increasingly relies on NGOs to investigate and report human
rights violations.161 These NGOs now enjoy considerable influence in
virtually all UN decision-making processes mainly by providing various
bodies with information relevant to their activities.162 Most importantly,
NGOs shape global public opinion while exploiting the moral authority
inherent in human rights rhetoric, which often elicits instinctive support.163 The prime weapon of human rights NGOs is the “mobilization of
shame.”164 This technique seeks to induce compliance with human rights
norms by reporting the behavior of target states, which exposes these
states to embarrassment, ostracism, and isolation.165
Despite many NGOs’ important goals and their aspiration to reflect the
interests and positions of large sectors in international civil society, their
activities should be looked upon with caution. NGOs are often described
as self-elected elite that have limited legitimacy, advocate special causes
and are unrepresentative of the general public.166 Moreover, their fine
organizational capabilities, stemming from their relatively small size,
enable them to exercise effective lobbying that is arguably disproportional to their actual public support.167 Finally, in light of the general observation that “[a]ctors [in international politics] attempt to mislead and
manipulate target actors by disseminating incorrect or only partially
correct facts and interpretations to create desired expectations and con-

159. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
160. Blitt, supra note 78, at 292; Mertus, supra note 119, at 1369.
161. Blitt, supra note 78, at 263.
162. PAYNE & SAMHAT, supra note 158, at 69–70; Blitt, supra note 78 at 263, 296–
317; Mertus, supra note 119, at 1369–72.
163. Blitt, supra note 78, at 262–63, 290.
164. Id. at 290.
165. Id. at 290–91; Mertus, supra note 119, at 1368–69.
166. E.g., John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism
and Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 245
(2003); Mertus, supra note 119, at 1385; Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2018 (2004); Stein, supra note 119, at 491; Andrew J.
Walker, When a Good Idea is Poorly Implemented: How the International Criminal
Court Fails to be Insulated from International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process
Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 245, 295–96 (2004).
167. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 119, at 171–72.
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ceptions,” it is even possible that NGOs deliberately deceive on certain
occasions.168
Particularly significant, again, are human rights organizations, because
of their political influence and their central role in circulating communications critical of states. Thus, the human rights NGO community is said
to have a problematic record with regard to accuracy in reporting.169
Several factors might support and explain this assertion.
First, no prerequisite or certification is required in order to pursue the
classic activities of human rights organizations, since anyone may simply
take steps to investigate and publish reports.170 Additionally, no “formal
checks or balances . . . regulate the quality or reliability of NGO work”
once it is performed.171 This sometimes has apparent negative consequences. Some studies of the works of human rights organizations have
demonstrated that their fact-finding missions commonly do not comport
with reasonable procedural and evidentiary standards.172 For example,
they often rely upon hearsay statements and documents that are not fully
authenticated; the witnesses they question are not cross-examined; they
do not operate for sufficient periods; they do not possess enough personnel to guarantee sufficient thoroughness; their reports rarely contain
dissenting opinions; and the line between their inferences and concrete
findings of fact is frequently blurred.173 The depth, quality, and reliability
of their work may also be jeopardized on many occasions by reliance on
testimony of interested parties.174 Furthermore, international NGOs often
base their reports on the fact-finding of nationally based NGOs, which
are likely to be more biased against a party to a conflict, “without meaningful guidelines for obtaining corroborative evidence or . . . [checking
the] methodologies employed by the national” organization.175

168. VERTZBERGER, supra note 115, at 27.
169. Blitt, supra note 78, at 263.
170. Id. at 288.
171. Id. at 292.
172. See HANS THOOLEN & BERTH VERSTAPPEN, HUMAN RIGHTS MISSIONS: A STUDY
OF FACT-FINDING PRACTICE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 1, 18 (1986); David
Weissbrodt, Human Rights Implementation and Fact-finding by International Organizations, 74 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 17, 18 (1980).
173. See Blitt, supra note 78, at 289 and the sources cited therein; INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 203 (B.G. Ramcharan, ed.,
1982).
174. See id.
175. Id. at 341–42, 360.

140

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:1

Second, there is ample evidence of bias and political motivation among
NGOs.176 Particularly, some NGOs are funded by interested governments
or private donors that influence their operation,177 while the public at
large is often completely unaware of such influence.178
And, third, the fact that many NGOs compete for scarce media coverage and limited resources from a few foundations is said to generate
constant competition between them.179 This competition in turn incentivizes them to devise dramatic new angles and to uncover even greater
atrocities, sometimes at the expense of accuracy.180
Many commentators resist such criticism and claim that informal controls to which human rights NGOs are subject—mainly their interests in
maintaining their own reputations—guarantee the quality of their
work.181 However, even assuming that most reports issued by human
rights organizations—at least, by the most prominent and influential
ones—are true, this does not preclude the risk of mistakes. Thus, the
need to redress the harms of false reports may not be dismissed.182
4. Interested Governments and State Officials
Governments often use propaganda to further various legitimate interests, but, for some, propaganda constitutes a weapon of distortion and
176. See, for instance, the position of the founder of Human Rights Watch. Robert L.
Bernstein, Rights Watchdog, Lost in the Mideast, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at
A31.
177. See Gonahasa v. U.S. Immig’n & Natural’n Serv., 181 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir.
1999); M.A. A26851062 v. U.S. Immig’n & Natural’n Serv., 899 F.2d 304, 313, 331, 359
(4th Cir. 1990); Rachel Brett, The Role and Limits of Human Rights NGOs at the United
Nations, 43 POL. STUD. 96, 98 (1995); Mertus, supra note 119, at 1376–77.
178. Gonahasa, 181 F.3d at 542; M.A. A26851062, 899 F.2d at 313, 331, 359;
Bernstein, supra note 176; Brett, supra note 177, at 98; Mertus, supra note 119, at 1376–
77.
179. See, e.g., Clifford Bob, Merchants of Morality, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar.–Apr. 2002 ,
36, 37; James Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, Transnational Information
Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986–2000, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 557, 575 (2005).
180. Gonahasa, 181 F.3d at 542; Vaduva v. U.S. Immig’n & Natural’n Serv., 131 F.3d
689, 691 (7th Cir. 1997); Blitt, supra note 78, at 332; see id. at 331, 354–56.
181. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Beyond ‘Them’ and ‘Us’: Putting Treaty Body Reform
into Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 501, 509
(Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000); Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability in
NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 203–04 (2002).
182. For the sake of comparison, even though it may be assumed that most stories
published in the press—at least by the leading media outlets—are correct, and that those
media have an interest in maintaining their reputations, only few question the social need
for a law of defamation to address the inevitable cases in which mistakes occur.
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defamation.183 States have often disseminated misinformation in order to
influence foreign governments’ decision-making so as to advance national interests.184 States have also used false reports initially publicized
in the media for their own purposes.185 Finally, there are arguably cases
in which government officials deliberately deceive their counterparts,
superiors, or subordinates in order to promote the policies they wish their
own state to adopt.186
B. The Insufficiency of Existing Mechanisms to Redress Reputational
Harms
As has been demonstrated, suing for defamation in a domestic court is
not an available option for a state that has been the subject of a false, derogatory report. The following analysis will indicate that such a state
cannot count on mechanisms outside the scope of defamation law to
properly protect its interests either.
1. Relying on Market Competition to Correct Erroneous Reports
Defamed states may allegedly count on competition in the press market
to drive media outlets to expose each others’ mistakes. This possibility,
however, should be given limited weight.
First, it cannot be assumed that competing media will always be willing to bear the cost of conducting an extensive investigation in order to
refute a defamatory report. This is true especially since reports refuting
or contradicting allegations of outrageous conduct are not as sensational
and dramatic as the accusations themselves.187 As Justice William Brennan of the United States Supreme Court has contended in the context of
personal defamation: “Denials, retractions, and corrections are not ‘hot’
news.”188

183. Whitton, supra note 117, at 601–02.
184. KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 25, 51; see also VERTZBERGER, supra note 115, at 27.
185. See Blitt supra note 78, at 350–51.
186. For example, it has been asserted recently that the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in
2003 was influenced by an intercepted letter indicating a link between Saddam Hussein
and Al-Qaeda, which turned out to have been faked. RON SUSKIND, THE WAY OF THE
WORLD: A STORY OF TRUTH AND HOPE IN AN AGE OF EXTREMISM 172–74 (2008). The
U.S. administration denied this report. Joby Warrick, CIA More Fully Denies Deception
About Iraq, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 23, 2008, at A03.
187. See supra Part V.A.2 for discussion of media motivations.
188. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46–47 (1971).
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Second, concentration of ownership in mass media is said to seriously
diminish the competition in that market.189 Scholars therefore claim that
the contents and viewpoints communicated by the press are likely to
become increasingly homogeneous,190 and often use as an example the
rather uniform position taken by the U.S. media in support of the government before and during the Second Gulf War.191
Some commentators add that media outlets might even demonstrate
real reluctance to attack each others’ publications, wishing to show
professional courtesy or to receive similar treatment themselves.192 The
situation in the realm of international news intensifies such concerns.
Many media outlets opt for the relatively cheap method of relying on
news agencies for their international affairs reports.193 Since four major
suppliers dominate the news agency market, the prisms through which
most international news enters the public domain are quite uniform.194
This is especially true in developing countries, where the media lacks
resources and, therefore, depends on news agencies and global networks
for information.195 The increasing reliance of transnational news agencies
on their national counterparts196 further reduces the likelihood of obtaining diverse viewpoints with regard to particular events.
For similar reasons, one may not assume that inaccurate reports issued
by NGOs and circulated through the media are often corrected by the
media. Nor may competition in the NGO community itself be relied upon
as a check. By definition, NGOs tend to promote causes that do not
appeal to states and often even contradict states’ interests. Few NGOs
dedicate their activities to supporting particular states or enhancing gen189. ERIC BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 122 (1995);
BOLLINGER, supra note 140, at 27, 162 n.1–2; GILLMOR, supra note 155, at 9; LUCAS A.
POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN
AMERICA 272 (1991); Donald Meiklejohn, Public Speech and Libel Litigation: Are They
Compatible?, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 566–67 (1986); Perzanowski, supra note 155, at
850, n.116; Oswald, supra note 74, at 387.
190. GILLMOR, supra note 155, at 9; Graubart, supra note 142, at 658; Meiklejohn,
supra note 189, at 567.
191. Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation in Three Dimensions, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845, 884 (2008).
192. James H. Hulme, Vindicating Reputation: An Alternative to Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 375, 394 n.101 (1981); Note, Vindication of the
Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1730, 1732 (1967) [hereinafter Vindication of Reputation]; see also Frasier, supra note 106, at 505.
193. KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 24.
194. TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 68–69.
195. KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at 24.
196. Id. at 22.
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eral state interests such as national security, crime control, or public
order; the ones that do are unlikely to attract much media attention.
The appearance of the internet has not changed the portrayed reality
dramatically. No single internet publication can be as effective as a report in the traditional mass media, which still constitute the primary
source of information in the Western world.197 Though there are news
websites that enjoy impressive popularity, most are subsidiaries of the
major newspapers and television networks.198 Furthermore, it should be
remembered that “in order to retrieve information about a certain topic
[on the internet], one must actively conduct a targeted search.”199 However, “[f]ew people have the time or wish to expend the effort to explore
the gigantic virtual world in any depth . . . .”200 Thus, a person researching on the internet who is not specifically looking for information about a
certain state will not frequently come across any such information.201
2. Self-Help: Disseminating the State’s Response
A course of action supposedly available to defamed states is to try to
have their version of the relevant facts published in one forum or another. But this option is not very promising. First of all, in the current global
reality, the state is obliged to interact not only with other states, but also
with intergovernmental and supranational institutions, networks of regulators, corporations, investors, NGOs, and so forth. This means that it is
much more difficult for the state to locate the relevant actors and inform
them of its position on a certain issue.
Reaching global public opinion through the media is especially hard.202
Here again, the fact that denials are not as exciting as the allegations preceding them is the primary obstacle to having the state’s reply published
prominently in the commercial press. To the extent that governments
reply to defamatory accusations against them in state-owned newspapers
or on television stations, such outlets are unlikely to obtain sufficient
exposure to foreign publics in order to effectively negate the impact of
previous negative reports. Responding on news websites or official state
websites is not generally helpful either, given the above-mentioned
characteristics of the internet.
197.
862.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See Levi, supra note 140, at 1104–05; Perzanowski, supra note 155, at 850–51,
MCCOMBS, supra note 130, at 147–48.
See Peled, supra note 91, at 53.
MCCOMBS, supra note 130, at 147–48.
See Magarian, supra note 191, at 889; Peled, supra note 91, at 53.
Saleem, supra note 151, at 138–39.
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States do not have a right of reply vis-à-vis publishers of defamatory
content. The laws of common law countries do not grant a right of reply
even to natural persons.203 Though many civil law systems do recognize
such a norm, it is rarely enjoyed by governments—let alone foreign
ones—as they are normally not deemed to have a legal right to reputation
in the first place.204 And as to ethical standards, which often impose a
general duty to publish a reply in appropriate cases, they rarely bind the
press.205
The assumption that self-help is effective is particularly questionable
with regard to less-developed states, which lack the communication
capabilities to effectively compete globally through public diplomacy
and to disseminate their positions and viewpoints worldwide.206
Finally, even where states succeed in disseminating their versions of
the facts, another crucial problem emerges: a reply has limited ability to
persuade the public of the falsity of the defamatory charges and to rem203. See generally Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (discussing U.S. law); see also Stephen Gardbaum, A Reply to The Right of Reply, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2008) (discussing the laws of the U.S., the U.K., Canada, and
Australia).
204. See BARENDT, supra note 189, at 157 (noting that “Continental legal systems
usually provide individuals and organizations with right of reply to (factual) allegations
in the press.”); Youm, supra note 48.
205. Rather they are merely guidelines. See, e.g., ROY L. MOORE, MASS
COMMUNICATION LAW AND ETHICS 16 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing U.S. law). But see
PARASCHOS, supra note 37, at 196 (stating that courts in various European countries consult ethical codes “to assess professional journalistic behavior”).
206. WILLIAM A. HACHTEN & JAMES F. SCOTTON, THE WORLD NEWS PRISM: GLOBAL
MEDIA IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM 104, 173–74 (6th ed. 2002); KUNCZIK, supra note 69, at
26. It is worth mentioning in this context the “New World Information Order,” which is a
series of documents adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). The New World Information Order seeks to promote the right
of every nation to participate in the international exchange of information, and to provide
international publics with a comprehensive and balanced flow of information. Among the
enumerated ways of fulfilling that goal is to ensure that states that feel injured by information published about them be heard. This is, however, a mere declaration of principles
unaccompanied by recognition of a legal right to reply, let alone a device for enforcing
such a right. See Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of
the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid, and Incitement to War,
U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO] Res. 4/9.3/2, art. 5 (Nov. 28, 1978),
available at http://www.unescdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114032Eb.pdf; Thomas Cochrane, The Law of Nations in Cyberspace: Fashioning a Cause of Action for the
Suppression of Human Rights Reports on the Internet, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 157, 177–78 (1997); Graubart, supra note 142, at 639.
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edy reputational harm,207 since it is necessarily perceived as biased.208 In
particular, publics often mistrust communications by governments.209 As
Wang notes:
The credibility and efficacy of the government, as the primary communicator, is now often suspected, because people tend to perceive communication by a foreign government as political propaganda. Without
source credibility, no amount of communication and information will
ever be effective and, worse, could even be counter-productive.210

V. AN INTERNATIONAL VERSION OF DEFAMATION LAW: EVALUATING
PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
As the foregoing analysis indicates, it is reasonable to assume that the
“marketplace of ideas” relating to international affairs fails to guarantee
the accuracy of the information disseminated worldwide about states.
This Article has also shown that the potential consequences of such market failures are serious. It is therefore justified to endow states with a
legal right to reputation, and to devise institutional and procedural instruments to give effect to such a right. At the same time, special care
must be taken to prevent excessive harm to actors involved directly or
indirectly in the international political debate, in order not to chill the
invaluable exchange of information and opinions. Regulation of the crucial and sensitive realm of speech is justified only insofar as its costs do
not exceed its benefits.
Designing a detailed international libel regime is a complex task that
exceeds the scope of the present framework. Instead, the following Part
will briefly discuss several plausible courses of action, rule out some,
and call for further examination of others.
Two theoretical alternatives may be dismissed at the outset. First,
establishing a cause of action for state defamation in domestic laws by
virtue of a multilateral agreement is ineffective, unrealistic, and undesirable. The main problem with this approach is the difficulty of adjudicating events that took place far away from the forum of the court, especially
when understanding the issues at hand requires on-site examinations,
questioning of individuals located abroad, overcoming language barriers,

207. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 782, 798 (1986); Perzanowski, supra note 155, at 869.
208. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 175–77
(1965); Frasier, supra note 106, at 510.
209. NYE, supra note 64, at 113.
210. Wang, supra note 67, at 94.
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or comprehending intricate political contexts. Thus, from the perspective
of the defamed state and the international community, this approach
would often fail to meet the goal of declaring the true nature of situations
and events. From the forum state’s perspective, substantial judicial resources would be expended with no real returns, and political tensions
with applicant states might arise. And from the media’s perspective, evidentiary hardships would yield high litigation costs. Coupled with the
questionable prospects of proving the accuracy of journalistic reports in
court and the limited interest of most media consumers in foreign affairs,
such hardships could produce a chilling effect and reduce the scope and
depth of foreign news reporting. Finally, forum shopping may be expected. A state defamed by a report disseminated in more than one state
would be tempted to sue in a country friendly to it in terms of political
orientation and convenient in terms of applicable law—perhaps even on
a reciprocal basis—thereby turning such a domestic-level regime into a
farce.
Second, holding states responsible for defamatory communications
published by private actors within their territories211—which would imply that governments should exert tough oversight over the work of the
media and might actually induce them to do so—does not coincide with
the modern conception of freedom of the press.
Two additional proposals will now be discussed in greater detail.
A. Option 1: Reviving and Modifying the CIRC
In the realm of private law, it is often contended that publication of a
defamed individual’s reply to the allegations against him or her, if it has
merits and is well phrased, is capable of reducing the libel’s influence on
listeners.212 The idea that reply properly redresses reputational harm213 is
supported by psychological research214 and by the fact that European defamation and media laws provide for a right of reply.215 A right of reply
211. Cf. William V. O’Brien, International Propaganda and Minimum World Public
Order, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 589, 593 (1966) (stating that it is established international law that a state is responsible for “condon[ing] or encourage[ing] warmongering,
subversive, and, in some cases, defamatory propaganda against another state as to contribute bases and materiel to an aggressive invader”).
212. See John Hayes, The Right to Reply: A Conflict of Fundamental Rights, 37
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 551, 576 (2004).
213. Perzanowski, supra note 155, at 860.
214. Calvert, supra note 53, at 937–38, 948–60.
215. Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the European Union, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 933, 952 (1996); Christopher J. Kunke, Rome II and
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also raises the quality of public debate by allowing media consumers to
critically evaluate the reports to which they are exposed.216
By analogy, a plausible remedy for defamation targeting states could
be to enable them to present their positions in response to disparaging
publications in a way that reaches the public.
The formation of a legal regime that would compel private media outlets throughout the world to provide states with a right of reply—which
is a theoretically powerful device for protecting states’ reputations—is
highly impractical,217 and might pose a grave threat to the editorial
autonomy of the press.218 A more reasonable alternative is to establish
mechanisms to facilitate the delivery of the defamed state’s response to
relevant international audiences. This is precisely the objective of the
CIRC, but as discussed in Part II, supra, the CIRC’s means of achieving
it are deficient.219 The CIRC could become more effective—and thus
more appealing to states—if the existing procedure, which relies on the
discretion and limited mass communication resources of the UN Secretary-General, were improved. For instance, state parties could create an
international forum accessible worldwide through the internet and possibly
by additional means, in which states’ manifestos would be published.
However, any instrument for an international right of reply would face
two inherent problems, both discussed supra. First, given the preferences
of modern media consumers, designing a forum for replies that would
attract sufficient public attention is hardly an easy task. Second, the utility of states’ replies is cast in serious doubt since many would view such
replies as untrustworthy political propaganda.220
B. Option 2: Establishing a Standing International Fact-Finding Commission
Many commentators believe that reputational harm can be effectively
cured if an impartial, official institution enjoying public trust and respect—typically a court—were to thoroughly examine the pertinent facts

Defamation: Will the Tail Wag the Dog?, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1733, 1761 (2005);
Danziger, supra note 49, at 183–95.
216. Hayes, supra note 212, at 576.
217. Crucially, the United States would surely refrain from joining such a regime absent a dramatic shift in its First Amendment jurisprudence, as indicated by Miami Herald
Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
218. Id.
219. See supra pp. 10–11.
220. NYE, supra note 64, at 113; Wang, supra note 67, at 94.
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and declare that the defamatory imputations are untrue.221 Declaratory
relief is thus compatible both with the principal desire of defamed
individuals222 (as indicated by empirical research)223 in restoring their
reputations, and with society’s interest in correcting false information
circulated in the public domain.224 Moreover, confining the remedy for
defamation to a declaratory judgment removes the major chiller of press
freedom, namely, publishers’ risks of being subject to significant damages awards.225 Against this background, various legislative and academic
proposals have been raised to institute a declaratory judgment procedure
within U.S. defamation law.226
A comparable mechanism could arguably be adopted in the international sphere. As the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)227 and the

221. Geoffrey C. Cook, Reconciling the First Amendment with the Individual’s Reputation: The Declaratory Judgment as an Option for Libel Suits, 93 DICK. L. REV. 265,
273 (1989); Epstein, supra note 207, at 814; see also IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF TORT LAW 136 (1993); Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some
Thoughts on Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 365 (2006).
222. See CHAFEE, JR., supra note 208, at 145; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 944
cmt. k.
223. Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the
Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 227 (1985); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Resolving
Libel Disputes out of Court: The Libel Dispute Resolution Program, in REFORMING LIBEL
LAW 286, 287–89 (John Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992).
224. Vindication of Reputation, supra note 192, at 1730.
225. See SACK, supra note 17, § 10.3.1; SUNSTEIN, supra note 107, at 161–62; Marc A.
Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REV.
809, 820 (1986); Jonathan Garret Erwin, Can Deterrence Play a Positive Role in Defamation Law?, 19 REV. LITIG. 675, 711 (2000); Hulme, supra note 192, at 393; Stanley
Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 835
(1985); Vindication of Reputation, supra note 192, at 1744–45; Michael J. Polelle, Racial
and Ethnic Group Defamation: A Speech-Friendly Proposal, 23 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
213, 259 (2003); Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan
in Its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287, 1288–90 (1988); Douglas R. Matthews,
American Defamation Law: From Sullivan, Through Greenmoss, and Beyond, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 513, 530 (1987).
226. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 27 Special Note on Remedies for
Defamation Other Than Damages; 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §9:96
(2d ed. 2009) (text of Annenberg Libel Reform Act); David A. Barrett, Declaratory
Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REV. 847 (1986); Franklin, supra
note 225; Hulme, supra note 192, at 393–94; Leval, supra note 225. See generally Cook,
supra note 221.
227. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35–36 (Apr. 9).
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International Law Commission228 have recognized, declaration by a
competent tribunal of the wrongfulness of an act is a legitimate remedy
for nonmaterial harm. In addition, there is an increasing understanding
that the resolution of international “disputes arising predominantly from
a difference of opinion on facts [may be facilitated] by elucidating these
facts.”229
The task of examining the accuracy of defamatory publications should
be entrusted to an institution with such features and processes as would
ensure maximum professionalism, efficiency, and fairness to all actors
involved. The ICJ does not appear to be an ideal candidate for such an
assignment. First, the ICJ’s jurisdiction only extends to contentious cases
between states230 and advisory opinions pursuant to the request of UN
organs.231 Suing states for defamation published by the private media
within their territories, as explained above, is not a suitable framework
for resolving international defamation disputes, and UN organs cannot
always be relied upon to act when appropriate. And, second, the ICJ is
often criticized for having questionable fact-finding capabilities and
practices.232
Alternatively, international bodies addressing human rights issues
could potentially vindicate states’ unjustly tarnished reputations in the
course of their routine work of investigating reports of human rights
abuses. However, the UN human rights institutions, notably the Human
Rights Council, are claimed to be heavily influenced by political considerations.233 In addition, such institutions are highly dependent upon information supplied by NGOs, which is not infrequently inaccurate.234
228. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 105-07, UN
Doc. A/56/10 (Aug. 10, 2001).
229. Anne Peters, International Dispute Settlement: A Network of Cooperational
Duties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2003).
230. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
231. Id. art. 65.
232. John R. Crook, The 2003 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice,
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 309, 310–11 (2004); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on
the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 53–54
(2005); Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of
International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity? 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
259, 302 n.190 (2007); Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 377, 433 (2006).
233. E.g., Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100
AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 791 (2006).
234. See supra Part VI(A)(3).
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Finally, not all defamatory content pertaining to states concerns human
rights issues.
As no other existing body seems suitable for administering international libel law, a plausible solution is to form a new institution designated
specifically for that purpose. Such an institution probably should not be a
court in the traditional sense. Any institution whose operation is largely
or exclusively confined to its physical territory is bound to have serious
difficulties in independently ascertaining the facts of remote conflicts.235
Instead, inspiration may be drawn from fact-finding commissions in particular regimes. Such commissions were established, for instance, by
Article 90 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts;236 Article 1 of the European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;237 Article 26 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities;238 and Article 33 of the Convention on the Law of
the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.239 These commissions are authorized to engage in active information gathering and to
conduct onsite visits,240 which significantly enhance their fact-finding
capabilities. Under additional rules that apply to at least some of these

235. See the discussion concerning the ICJ, supra note 232. Additionally, the European
Court of Human Rights had to rely heavily on NGO reports on at least one occasion, in
which information about the prevailing conditions in a place outside Europe—Tunisia—
was necessary for the resolution of the case. See Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 65–94 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN.
236. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
237. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 1152 [hereinafter European Torture
Convention].
238. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995,
34 I.L.M. 351 [hereinafter European Minorities Convention].
239. Convention on the law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter International Watercourses Convention]. The convention has not entered into force yet. International Water Law Project—
Status of the Watercourse Convention, http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/
intldocs/watercourse_status. (last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
240. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 239, art. 33(7); European
Torture Convention, supra note 237, art. 1; Protocol I, supra note 236, art. 90(4); Wolfgang Benedek, Final Status of Kosovo: The Role of Human Rights and Minority Rights,
80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 215, 217 (2005) (referring to the processes established in the European Torture Convention and the European Minorities Convention).
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commissions, states are obliged to give them access to any site relevant
to their mandate,241 to provide them with necessary information,242 to
allow them to hold closed meetings with relevant parties,243 and to grant
their members immunity from legal process of any kind.244 The commissions on torture and on minority rights fulfill their fact-finding roles and
routinely issue reports in their respective fields.245
In this Article’s context, the fact-finding commission would conduct
factual investigation at the request of a state seeking to refute specific
defamatory content, and would publish its findings. As the objective of
the procedure would be to determine the facts rather than to punish the
defamers, the latter would not be defendants, nor would they be subject
to any duty or sanction even if the commission found for the applicant
state. Furthermore, the commission’s holding that the defamatory
charges are false would not prevent anyone from insisting thereafter that
the charges were nevertheless accurate. While ordinary individuals tend
to attribute importance to judicial and quasi-judicial decisions and thus
consider them reliable, they presumably recognize that judges and comparable fact-finders might err, and they would not be immune to persuasion that such is the case with respect to a given dispute.246 Thus, the
commission’s findings are expected to be useful in bettering the applicant state’s image, but at the same time, the findings could foster subsequent global public discourse.
Though the lack of an adversarial process might look like a recipe for
the commission’s “capture” by the interests and resources of the applicant state, this outcome is avoidable. Any dispute involving a state
necessarily involves additional actors with opposing interests and views,
241. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 239, art. 33(7); European
Torture Convention, supra note 237, arts. 2, 8.
242. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 239, art. 33(7); European
Torture Convention, supra note 237, arts. 8(2)(b), 8(2)(d).
243. European Torture Convention, supra note 237, art. 8(3); Council of Europe, Rules
Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on the Monitoring Arrangements Under Articles
24 to 26 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Res.
97(10), ¶ 32, (Sept. 17, 1997).
244. See International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, Rules of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, Rule 27(3) (July 8, 1992), available at
http://www.ihffc.org/en/documents/rules-of-procedure.pdf; European Torture Convention, supra note 237, art. 16, Annex.
245. See European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, About the CPT, http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm (last
visited Aug. 8, 2009); European Minorities Convention, supra note 238.
246. See Frasier, supra note 106, at 517; Peled, supra note 91, at 76–77.
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be they other countries, domestic minority groups, peoples under belligerent occupation, NGOs, media outlets that previously published relevant
reports about the state, and the like. These actors could provide the
commission with information in support of their respective stances and
should be allowed to do so. Such actors in fact compete currently to influence international public opinion, but the failures they generate in the
unregulated international marketplace of ideas are likely to decrease if all
the available information is processed within the confines of neutral and
professionalized procedures. The relevant actors’ levels of cooperation
with the commission may also be mentioned in the commission’s report,
especially if the behavior of the actors prevents the commission from
reaching conclusive findings.247 Such obstruction could occur, for instance, if the applicant state or another state, authority, or organization
involved were to prohibit the commission’s entry to certain places, limit
its access to certain documents, or bar its communication with certain
groups.
Within the definition of the commission’s competence, as clear a line
as possible must be drawn between political value judgments, which may
not be adjudicated, and assertions of objective fact, which may. Though
that distinction, as well as the determination of truth and falsity, is hardly
an easy task, the analogy to domestic defamation laws—under which the
distinctions between fact and opinion, and between truth and falsehood,
are essential elements248—indicates that it is achievable. An equally important effort should be made to distinguish between allegations pertaining to relatively concrete events, which ought to be the sole subject of the
defamation process, and publications providing professional analysis of
complex political or economic situations, the evaluation of which cannot
possibly lead to conclusive and unequivocal results. For similar practical
reasons, it might be advisable to confine international libel law to certain
kinds of reputations, relating, for instance, to law observance and moral
behavior, as opposed to military or financial strength.
Many other issues will also have to be addressed. For instance, with
regard to substantive law, the regime must define the nature and extent of
the required link between an applicant state and the defamation complained of that would trigger the fact-finding process. Among the institutional issues that arise is the fact-finding commission’s composition. The
members of the commission should be elected in a way that would both
247. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 87(7), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol I, supra note 236, art. 90(5)(b).
248. Epstein, supra note 207, at 809.
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guarantee the commission’s professionalism, and satisfy states’ presumed desires to maintain control of the election process, thereby enhancing the commission’s legitimacy and the degree of cooperation it
elicits. At least some of the commission’s members should be reputable
journalists. Finally, with regard to procedure, the commission must be
equipped with all the tools necessary to gather and evaluate materials
effectively and to avoid dependence on the information supplied by interested parties. In addition, the status of the defamer in the process
should be defined, and mechanisms should be formed to ensure that the
commission’s reports obtain adequate publicity and attention worldwide.
These issues and many more will have to wait for further research.
CONCLUSION
The idea of endowing states with a legal right to reputation certainly
seems odd at first glance. But upon exploring the concept of reputation
and understanding the individual and collective interests that justify its
protection under domestic laws, it becomes clear that reputation is as
valuable to states and the international community as it is to individuals
and the societies they live in. The law, which aims to regulate human
affairs compatibly with the realities and needs of any given time, place,
and context, should not ignore these observations. Considering that international law is essentially an endeavor to build an organized society of
actors that would try to imitate, to the extent feasible, the internal order
prevailing in modern states, and given the fact that the array of issues
international law treats is consistently expanding, it is plausible to add
yet another segment to that legal fabric and to begin thinking about an
international parallel to defamation law.
This Article did not intend to present a complete account of the desirable international libel law—quite the contrary, I recognize that the suggested courses of action would be hard to implement and that the best
solution may lie elsewhere. Rather, my purpose is to raise awareness of
the importance of state reputation and to demonstrate that it is worthy of
legal protection. If states and the international community as a whole
begin to regard the interest in reputation as a right, they might be more
determined to protect it.

